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The interpretation and application of international human rights conventions is an 
especially delicate task. Although the international courts charged with interpreting them 
have, within their sphere of competence, the function of protecting human rights against 
possible state interferences, the exercise of their jurisdictional role is impossible without a 
constant reconciliation of elements and values that may be in tension. These courts must 
exercise great skill to accommodate citizens’ expectations of rights protection, the will of 
the states, either collective or individual, and democratic considerations in social settings 
that are plural and changing.    
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), which will 
be the subject of this paper, is an example of these difficulties. Determining the 
requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (the "ECHR" or “the 
Convention”) when analyzing whether a member state of the Council of Europe has 
violated a right protected by the Convention involves a constant balancing between 
democracy and human rights in the region. This axiological duality inherent in the 
Convention has marked the jurisprudence of the ECtHR since its beginning. Although the 
Court has acquired a “constitutional narrative” in its reasoning, which is driving the ever-
greater protection of Convention rights, the Court itself has weakened this narrative in 
order to maintain its auctoritas vis-à-vis states, via hermeneutic recourse to the doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation.2 The way in which the ECtHR has used this doctrine, especially 
in areas such as religious liberty, is one of the most controversial aspects of its 
jurisprudence. In this article I will lay out the main characteristics of this doctrine; I will 
distinguish two versions of the margin of appreciation doctrine; and I will use the 
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parameters of what I will call a “rationalized version” of the margin to evaluate the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR with respect to religious symbols in public schools. 
I. The Outlines of Convention Rights 
Although the idea of human rights is fundamental to asserting the moral value of 
human life, insisting on institutional commitments, and incentivizing activism,3 the clauses 
on rights that we find in an international instrument like the Convention are a long way 
from reflecting a strong moral understanding of rights. Convention rights do not link up 
well with a conception of rights as “trumps” against collective interests (that is, with the 
idea that rights are not balanceable with considerations external to the rights themselves); 
or to use other related characterizations, with visions of rights as “firewalls,” rights as “side 
constraints,” or rights as “reason-blocking.”4 In general, the articulation of the Convention 
suggests flimsy rights that are readily balanceable against states’ public interest reasons 
and other value considerations. This weakness is captured in many of the Convention’s 
Articles, but especially in Articles 8 to 11, which contain the so-called “accommodation” 
or “limitation” clauses. As is well known, the dynamic of each of these articles is to 
recognize rights in the first paragraph and then to establish in a second paragraph a broad 
list of reasons that can justify state interference with these rights. 
Let us look, for example, at the structure of Article 9: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others5. 
 
Rights like those recognized in Article 9 do not match the image of a right as a trump, 
even when interpreted in the best light. For a reasonable characterization of its legal status 
that might have some textual support, we must look to alternative conceptions that better 
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reflect its relative strength. The issue of how to provide a conception of fundamental rights 
or of human rights that accounts for I) the practice of balancing them against public 
interests, but that at the same time II) permits us to maintain the priority of rights against 
collective goals has recently generated a large literature. 
Some authors argue for an attenuated version of rights as trumps that attempts to 
square the priority importance of rights with an exercise of balance and proportionality in 
their confrontation with other social considerations.6 The same objective can be sought 
from the perspective of other theories of rights that permit a greater flexibility in their 
confrontation with collective interests. Some version of the Razian theory of rights as 
protected interests, or of the vision of rights as social goals along the lines initiated by 
Amartya Sen, could serve this purpose. The first view permits us to acknowledge a right in 
its central core on account of the value of the interest that supports it, but also allows us to 
assess which duties it justifies or which derived rights it entails, keeping other 
considerations of duty in mind.7 The second view, in conceiving of rights as social goals 
with intrinsic value that the state must pursue, considers a failure to satisfy them to be a 
great shortcoming. But on this conception it seems plausible to assume that rights may 
yield other considerations of value that may limit the scope of the right.8 
Another way to characterize the rights like those recognized in Article 9 of the 
Convention would be eschew any substantive notion of rights and limit oneself to adopt, 
along the lines of Robert Alexy, a structural conception that conceives of them as 
principles. We could understand them as optimization requirements, whose satisfaction is 
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a matter of degree. Their very nature asks for their balancing against other principles, 
whether these principles refer to other Convention rights or to collective interests. From 
this perspective, the application of Convention rights would require an exercise of 
proportionality or balancing with other value considerations.  The Convention’s 
accommodation clauses would act here as guides that set out which kind of considerations 
must be balanced by the ECtHR in cases of state interference with protected rights. 
But Alexy’s structural theory does not grant any priority to rights as against other 
principles regarding collective interests. In this way, although the theory may satisfactorily 
account for the logic of the German constitutional system of rights protection, it may not 
do the job if the goal is to emphasize the priority of rights in an international instrument 
with the structure of the Convention9. For this reason, authors such as Mathias Kumm insist 
that a structural theory like that of Alexy must be complemented with considerations of 
political justice that justify the priority of principles-rights in the application of the 
proportionality test when they come into conflict with other principles10. 
Despite the importance of this discussion I will not dwell on these problems. 
Independent of what is the best way of conceiving of rights in the Convention, in this paper 
what interests me is to emphasize another aspect of the ECtHR’s approach to Convention 
rights. In addition to the fact that these rights do not match up well with the conception of 
rights as trumps, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has created an additional mechanism, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, which may result in an even greater weakening of 
Convention rights as against the public interest and the decisions of the states of the Council 
of Europe. The margin of appreciation doctrine appears mainly linked to the presence of 
the accommodation clauses of the ECHR, norms that by their nature provide some 
maneuvering space to states in deciding when and in what measure to limit a Convention 
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right11. But the ECtHR has made expansive use of this doctrine and has applied it in spheres 
where the text of the Convention does not include an accommodation clause. That has led 
to a broad debate about whether the ECtHR is jeopardizing its own function as a body for 
human rights protection in Europe. 
II. The national margin of appreciation doctrine 
From the beginning of its history, and with greater articulation since Handyside v. 
United Kingdom, the ECtHR has adopted the margin of appreciation doctrine with the 
purpose of granting deference to states’ judgments in protecting the rights set out in the 
Convention.12 The Court has offered various reasons justifying this deference. On one 
hand, it has observed that the European system of human rights protection is the product 
of the division of labor between the states and the Court. The states are mainly responsible 
for this protection and the Strasbourg court only intervenes in a subsidiary way; that is, 
through contentious proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been exhausted. On 
the other hand, in areas as sensitive as morality or religion there is no consensus among 
states, and domestic authorities, being in direct contact with the vital forces of the their 
countries, are better situated to appreciate the social circumstances and to decide how to 
manage conflictive situations. Nevertheless, according to the ECtHR itself, this margin is 
limited, is subject to supervision, and will vary as a function of the sensitivity of the issue, 
the type of right in play, the degree to which the legitimate interests pursued by the state 
can be considered objectively, and the evolution of the European consensus on the matter.13 
As a product of this jurisprudential doctrine, the judicial function that the ECtHR 
takes on is not that of carrying out an abstract examination of the compatibility between a 
state measure and the provisions of the Convention. Rather, its task consists of reviewing 
whether a state has overstepped its margin of appreciation in the protection of Convention 
rights. That marks an important difference with respect to the type of reasoning that a 
domestic constitutional court can undertake. At the same time, it entails a particularized or 
contextual review of the challenged national measure, considering the internal situation of 
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each country and its legal, political, and social circumstances. This contextual examination 
of compatibility with the Convention makes it possible for the ECtHR to provide different 
answers in cases that are similar but arise in differentiated domestic circumstances. 
The margin of appreciation doctrine has been criticized as an hermeneutic device for 
making it more difficult to generalize the legal answers of the Court, for provoking 
structural incoherence, and in general for endangering legal certainty and preventing the 
Convention from consolidating a reliable system of rights protection in the region.14 The 
doctrine has also been praised for being a mechanism that assures the rhetorical flexibility 
necessary to legitimize the authority of the Court over the decisions of states in rights 
protection, and for reflecting as well the democratic pluralism existing in Europe.15 
One of the areas in which the margin of appreciation doctrine has had the greatest 
influence in recent year is in the understanding of the right to religious freedom recognized 
in Article 9 of the Convention and in the interpretation of Article 2 of its Protocol 1, which 
establishes the right of parents to educate their children according to their religious and 
philosophical convictions. Here the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has granted states very 
broad autonomy to interfere with religious freedom via secular laws; has opened the way 
for states’ overprotection of majority religious sensibilities as against freedom of 
expression; has endorsed rules that impose the presence of a crucifix in public schools; and 
has not raised objections to states’ restrictions of headscarves and other religious clothing 
in the educational context.16 
In this text I will focus especially on two of the ECtHR’s lines of jurisprudence. The 
first is the one sketched out since the Lautsi case, and the other is the one that the Court 
has adopted with regard to domestic rules that restrict the use of the Islamic headscarf in 
public schools. In both areas, which I will summarize shortly, the use of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine has played a transcendental role in the direction of the Court’s 
judgments.  
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III. The margin of appreciation doctrine and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
on religious symbols in schools 
3.1. The case of Lautsi v. Italy 
On March 18, 2011, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR surprised many observers in 
reversing a November 3, 2009 Chamber ruling, which had established unanimously that 
the Italian regulation, that since the 1920s had mandated the presence of a crucifix in public 
schools, had violated the right of Mrs. Lautsi to educate her children according to her 
secular convictions, as well as the religious freedom of her children, aged 11 and 13 at the 
time. 
The arguments that the Chamber used to justify its finding of a violation of the 
Convention are a typical example of an abstract evaluation of compatibility between the 
Italian regulation and Convention rights. The Chamber’s ruling (hereinafter “Lautsi 2009”) 
held that a crucifix in a classroom of a public school, being a religious symbol, could 
trouble non-believing students emotionally, and give them the perception that their 
educational context was marked by religion. This interference threatens rights of religious 
freedom because it contradicts the state’s duty to be neutral on this matter, a duty that 
prohibits the state from imposing religious beliefs, even indirectly, when it is dealing with 
people who are especially vulnerable or depend on the state. 
The Grand Chamber reversed this initial ruling of the Chamber, clarifying its position 
and incorporating the margin of appreciation doctrine in evaluating the Italian regulation. 
In the first place, the Court clarified the Convention requirements of state religious 
neutrality in the educational realm. Drawing on its jurisprudence in the cases Folguerø and 
Zengin,17 it indicated that this requirement consists of a prohibition on proselytizing or 
indoctrination in the educational framework, which is compatible with establishing 
mandatory religious education and giving priority to the knowledge of the majority 
religion. 
Second, the Grand Chamber asserted that the crucifix is a passive religious symbol 
whose influence cannot be compared with that of education and participation in religious 
activities. For this reason, it reversed the ruling of the Chamber and held that there was not 
                                                     




sufficient evidence either to affirm or to reject that the presence of this religious symbol 
“could” affect students or influence them. In this sense, although it seemed understandable 
that parents would have a subjective perception that the presence of the crucifix indicated 
a lack of respect for their rights, this subjective perception was not enough to determine 
that there had been a violation of the Convention.18 
Third, the Grand Chamber resorted to the margin of appreciation doctrine. According 
to the Court, as long as there is no intention to indoctrinate, the state enjoys a margin of 
appreciation in deciding on the presence of the crucifix in classrooms. The Italian state 
considered it an aspect of its tradition and a sign of its identity, and the decision whether 
to perpetuate a tradition falls in principle within its margin of appreciation. It was likewise 
the state’s prerogative to decide how to reconcile the place it assigns to religion in the 
educational sphere with the rights of parents and students. The ECtHR found that an 
additional factor supporting this margin was the lack of consensus among states on the 
presence of religious symbols in public schools and on the maintenance of these traditions. 
Finally, although the Grand Chamber acknowledged that the crucifix gives greater 
visibility to the Catholic religion in schools, it also indicated – again applying the margin 
of appreciation doctrine – that this extreme must be put into perspective, considering also 
the Italian state’s attitude on religious pluralism in schools. In the case of Italy the crucifix 
was not linked to any compulsory Catholic instruction; the school environment was open 
to other religions, there was nothing to prevent students from using other religious symbols 
such as the headscarf; celebrations of other religions were permitted; and there was nothing 
prohibiting alternative religious education for other creeds. 
All of these elements seemed adequate to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR to 
conclude that the Italian state was respecting religious pluralism in schools; that Mrs. 
Lautsi could still exercise the right to educate her children according to her beliefs; and 
that the negative religious freedom of her children had not been harmed. 
Both the Chamber’s and the Grand Chamber’s rulings have been widely criticized. 
The first was criticized as a display of Christianity-phobia; for imposing a model of strict 
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secularism that respected neither pluralism nor existing traditions in Europe, nor Europe’s 
diversity of religion-state relations; and finally for exceeding the powers of the Court’s 
competency in the protection of Convention rights.19 The ruling of the Grand Chamber, 
meanwhile, has been criticized as a setback for secularism in Europe; for being a political 
decision; for giving in to pressure from some states and European institutions; and in 
general, for indicating an abandonment of the functions of the ECtHR.20 
Independent of these criticisms, what is certain is that the main difference between 
the two results is due to the role that the margin of appreciation doctrine plays in the final 
decision of the Grand Chamber, an interpretive doctrine that is absent in the Chamber’s 
analysis. Is the broad use that the Grand Chamber makes of this doctrine justified? Before 
getting into and answering this question, I will briefly pause to discuss the second line of 
decisions that I mentioned earlier. 
 
3.2. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the Islamic headscarf in educational settings 
The restriction on the use of the headscarf and other religious articles in public 
schools has generated a substantial controversy in Europe, a controversy that the case-law 
of the ECtHR has resolved by always accepting the judgments of states.21 The French and 
Turkish regulations, which represent an active secularism that restricts religious expression 
in public space, are those that have generated the greatest number of cases brought to the 
Strasbourg court, many of which have been rejected for being “manifestly” ill-founded. 
From this jurisprudence one can conclude that states have the autonomy to limit the 
use of the headscarf in some classrooms or in all, both in public schools and in universities; 
this restriction can cover teachers and can extend to Islamic schools financed by the state. 
The arguments that have been considered legitimate and have been provided to justify 
limitations on the use of headscarves in schools are very varied. The most generic reason 
is the state’s embrace of an active secularism (the Kervanci, Dogru, Şahin, Köse and 
Dahlab cases). Also in general appeals have been made to public order, to protection of 
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the rights of others, and to the defense of democracy (especially in the Şahin case). Finally, 
other arguments that have been used as a reason to prohibit the use of the headscarf are 
those based on promoting gender equality (Dahlab and Şahin) and considerations of health 
and safety in sports (Kervanci and Dogru). 
In the case of Şahin v. Turkey, which is the case I will dwell on briefly, the 
controversy arose out of a circular from the academic authority of the University of Istanbul 
prohibiting the use of the Islamic headscarf on the premises. From that time on, the 
appellant, who was in her final years of her medical studies and had worn the headscarf to 
the university all along, was barred from taking exams and matriculating in some courses 
on account of her continued use of the headscarf. 
Just as in the other cases on the Islamic headscarf, the arguments of the ECtHR in 
approving of this restriction of religious freedom in the university were characterized by 
constant recourse to the margin of appreciation doctrine. The Court attributed the need to 
use the doctrine to the lack of consensus in Europe on this subject, and to the idea that state 
and university authorities are better situated than an international body to resolve the 
controversy. Although the Court recalled the state duty of religious neutrality and indicated 
that its function in this case consisted of determining whether the institutional measure was 
justified in principle and was proportional, it did not carry out a detailed analysis of this 
justification or of proportionality. Relying on the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court 
assumed in the first place that the political choice of state secularism could in itself justify 
restrictions on religious freedom and could require sacrifices from individuals for the sake 
of safeguarding tolerance and religious harmony. In the second place, it did not undertake 
to evaluate in detail the applicability of the general arguments of the Turkish state to the 
concrete case: the danger of radical Islamism to public order and democracy; respect for 
gender equality; and the protection of the rights of other students. The ECtHR concluded 
that state secularism combined with these general arguments were sufficient to determine 
that the prohibition, although it restricted the religious freedom of Leyla Şahin, did not 
violate the Convention.22 
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3.3.  A broad margin of appreciation for states? 
In line with what occurred in the Lautsi case, the Court’s jurisprudence on the Islamic 
headscarf is an example of the importance of the margin of appreciation doctrine to the 
Court’s reasoning and to its way of evaluating state restrictions on Convention rights. With 
respect to the headscarf, not only theorists but also human rights organizations have 
repeatedly denounced this reasoning as entailing a clear lack of protection for religious 
freedom in Europe. The judgment of the ECtHR in the Lautsi case has received these same 
criticisms. However, as I have already mentioned, many others retort that this deferential 
reasoning is the right vehicle by which the ECtHR, as an international institution, can 
maintain a constitutional narrative without losing its legitimacy vis-à-vis states. 
Whether we agree with one side or the other, what is certain is that the ECtHR, in 
exercising its function of interpreting the Convention, is seeking to achieve both legitimacy 
and substantive quality in its decisions. This conciliatory attempt seems to be inherent in 
the ECHR itself from the moment in which its preamble affirms that maintaining 
Convention rights rests, on one hand, on an effective political democracy, and on the other 
hand, on a common understanding and observance of human rights. This axiological 
duality could be seen as one of the specific features of the Convention, and as such must 
be present in any theory concerned with understanding the requirements that flow from this 
instrument.23 
The issue remains, however, whether the Court has succeeded in this conciliatory 
task in its jurisprudence on religious symbols. In the Lautsi case the strategy of the Grand 
Chamber, which shaped its ruling, was that of replacing the issue of whether there has been 
a justifiable interference with the forum internum of religious freedom – a right that the 
text of the Convention does not subject to public interest restrictions – with the question of 
whether the state, in the exercise of its margin of appreciation, was sufficiently neutral in 
its respect for the religious pluralism of its citizenry. This replacement enabled the Court 
to evaluate concretely the importance that the crucifix may have as a cultural tradition and 
as a sign of collective identity in Italy. It also permitted the Court to put the Italian 
regulation in context, analyzing the extent to which the Italian educational environment 
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was open to religious pluralism. The Grand Chamber ended up using what it has been 
called a “theory of neutralization,” which emphasizes those ways in which the Italian 
educational system is fair in its openness to religious pluralism in schools, to counteract its 
lack of neutrality with the symbols of the majority religion.24  
The Court displays a similar strategy in Şahin when it accepts in a rather uncritical 
fashion the state’s general arguments to justify the banning while it avoids entering into 
the detailed examination of proportionally required by Article 9.2. Even when these 
strategies do not find support in the text of the Convention, perhaps they could be admitted 
once we approach the doctrine of the margin as a general hermeneutic instrument to be 
used by the Court, endorsing an extension of this device beyond the accommodation 
clauses. Granting a wide margin to the state on religious issues could be justified by two 
elements of this doctrine: the lack of consensus and the idea that the state is better placed 
to decide on the suitable way of settling conflicts over religious symbols in educative 
institutions. 
From the information sought by the ECtHR itself, it is clear that there is no consensus 
in Europe about the exhibition of the crucifix in public schools. Its exhibition is prohibited 
in states such as Macedonia, Georgia, and France (excepting in Alsace and Moselle); it is 
compulsory in Italy, Austria, Poland, and in some German states and Swiss cantons, and 
some crucifixes are present without express state regulation in Spain, Greece, Ireland, San 
Marino, and Romania. It is also clear that there is no unanimous consensus on permission 
to wear the headscarf in educational institutions. Although the regulations deal with many 
different types of clothing, the people who wear it, and the schools the regulations apply 
to, one can find prohibitive measures or examples of restrictions in France, Turkey, 
Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, and Switzerland. 
It seems, then, that for the ECtHR the lack of consensus justifies granting greater 
breadth to the state margin. But the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been ambivalent with 
respect to the role of European consensus in the interpretation of the Convention. Although 
the Strasbourg court has frequently resorted to the absence of consensus or has concerned 
itself with the evolution of a European consensus as an important element of its 
jurisprudence, it has been a little erratic in its use as an interpretive reason. In this sense it 
                                                     




remains unclear, in the first place, what degree of lack of consensus can be determinative 
in broadening the state margin. Is it enough that there is not homogeneity among states, or 
rather that it is not possible to identify a clear and advancing tendency towards a given 
answer? The ECtHR has been very variable on this point.25 In the second place, it remains 
unclear at what level a lack of consensus on an issue may be determinant to justify greater 
deference. On many of the occasions in which the ECtHR has used this argument in 
religious conflicts, despite the fact that at the general regulatory level there was no 
homogeneity among states, one could rather find a consensus against the particular 
challenged measure. (Examples of this are the cases of Şahin v. Turkey, Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, Valsamis v. Greee, Köse v. Turkey, and Kervanci v. France).26 Finally, the 
state of consensus on socially sensitive issues seems to have had an unstable relevance for 
the ECtHR. Not every time that it has granted a broad margin of appreciation has the Court 
concerned itself with the level of regulatory homogeneity in Europe, nor has it reduced this 
margin when the contrary consensus has been clear.27 
We might say that the ECtHR has a general tendency to analyze the lack of European 
consensus or the evolution of consensus with a view to favoring the margin of appreciation, 
and associating it with an often-automatic assumption that national authorities are better 
situated than a body far from the concrete reality of a country to settle sensitive religious 
conflicts.28 As I will insist further on, this latter link may be very problematic. At the same 
                                                     
25See Gerards (2011, 109); Spielmann (2012, 18-22); Brauch (2005, 45-147). The lack-of-consensus argument has served, 
for example, to approve of institutional measures aimed at protecting majority religious sentiments against freedom of 
expression in the United Kingdom, Austria, Ireland, and Turkey, despite the fact that the ECtHR has acknowledged that 
there is a clear European tendency to eliminate prohibitions on mere religious offenses. See especially the cases Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria (September 20, 1994), Wingrove v. United Kingdom (November 25, 1996), Murphy v. 
Ireland (June 10, 2003), and I.A. v. Turkey (September 13, 2005). 
26 Also, in the Lautsi case, as was argued in the dissenting vote, if what we are inquiring about is the lack of consensus 
on the imposition of the crucifix in public schools in Europe, the states that impose it are a minority. Along the same 
lines, see the dissenting vote of Judge Tulkens in the Şahin case. Even in Handyside, the seminal case regarding the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, the controverted schoolbook had been commercialized in most European countries 
without any legal or social controversy. See Brauch (2005, 129-130). 
27 This has been the case in the issue of abortion, for example, where despite acknowledging the existence of a contrary 
consensus, the ECtHR has approved of the strict prohibition in Ireland, upholding it based on the profound moral values 
of Irish people concerning the nature of life. See A.B.C. v. Ireland (December 16, 2010). On the other hand, the evolution 
of the European consensus on conscientious objection to military service for religious reasons contributed to the Grand 
Chamber’s ruling (July 7, 2011) against Armenia in the Bayatyan case, revising the ruling of the Chamber that put the 
consensus aside and instead favored the margin of appreciation of Armenia, which did not foresee this possibility of 
objection. Changes in the European consensus have also been relevant in the Court’s jurisprudence on the rights of 
homosexual and transsexual people.  
28 Some judges of the ECtHR have criticized the automatic way in which it is argued that the state is better situated. Judge 
Rozakis, for example, has insisted that the margin of appreciation doctrine should only apply when states are in fact better 




time that the ECtHR resists imposing the European consensus on dissident states seems 
sensible given its effort to please states. Imposing the external consensus remains a 
counter-majoritarian instrument with respect to the internal democratic decisions of the 
dissident state.29 
The balances struck by the ECtHR to apply the margin of appreciation doctrine in 
areas such as that of state management of religious pluralism have led to a jurisprudence 
with a high degree of axiological incoherence that undermines the Convention principle of 
effective protection of individual rights.30 It is true that this axiological incoherence is more 
faithful to value disagreements that exist among states than the alternative of an abstract 
determination of compatibility, but the ambivalence of the Strasbourg court about the role 
of consensus blurs even this legitimizing effect. Should the ECtHR abandon the margin of 
appreciation doctrine? 
I. Two versions of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
To adequately evaluate this doctrine and answer the above question, it is important 
to distinguish between two versions of the margin of appreciation doctrine. The first is a 
version we might call “voluntarist.” It centers on the fact that the ECtHR is an international 
body, and involves a vision of the principle of subsidiarity that is normative and not merely 
temporal or procedural.31 From this perspective, the Court recognizes that its political 
legitimacy is strictly derived compared to that of states, and grants a robust baseline 
presumption in favor of the state, avoiding carrying out an independent evaluation of 
compatibility between the challenged measures and the Convention. This presumption is 
only rebutted when there are especially strong reasons to conclude that the state has 
overstepped its bounds in the exercise of its autonomy. On this conception, factors such as 
                                                     
careful evaluation of the case by the ECtHR, rather than automatically. See his concurring opinion in Egeland and 
Hanseid v. Norway (April 16, 2009). 
29 We might even have the case in which the dissident state grants a higher standard of protection of the right to religious 
freedom than that in the other member states. Here, the imposition of a European consensus, in addition to violating 
Article 53 of the Convention, would undercut substantive quality in human rights protection. On this point, see Arai-
Takahashi (2002, 15). On the idea that the European consensus does not necessarily entail an advancement of Convention 
rights protection, see also Brauch (2005, 146). 
30 For example, see the analyses of the treatment of the religious factor by the ECtHR in Martínez-Torrón (2012); Solar 
(2009). On the Convention principle of effective protection as a central standard that gives meaning to the Convention, 
see Greer (2003). 
31 A similar distinction between a structural concept and a substantive concept of the margin of appreciation can be found 




the lack of European consensus and the idea that the state is better situated become 
important for general reasons of institutional legitimacy. 
The voluntarist version of the margin (hereinafter “VVM”) is that which can be found 
behind the public opposition that Lautsi 2009 received from many states in the Council of 
Europe and other European institutions. Dominic McGoldrick’s opinion expresses the 
logic of the VVM when he asserts that the ECtHR must have a political antenna because 
“judicial authority ultimately depends on the confidence of the citizens and there is no real 
link between the European judges and the European population. If the Court’s 
interpretations deeply differ from the convictions of the people, the people (and their 
governments) will start resisting judicial decisions.”32Janneke Gerards also expresses this 
in asserting that the margin of appreciation is an attractive tool “to negotiate between the 
court’s task to protect human rights as effectively as possible, and its need to respect 
national sovereignty and make its judgments acceptable for national authorities.”33 
The second is a “rationalized” version of the national margin of appreciation. Here 
the margin doctrine is perceived as the result of reaching a balance between the values in 
play in the protection of Convention rights, rather than as a strong baseline presumption in 
favor of the state. This rationalized version of the margin (hereinafter “RVM”) is, for 
example, that which inspires the accommodation clauses seen in Articles 8 to 11 of the 
Convention, and in general is that which would be adjusted to the axiological duality 
expressed in the preamble of this international treaty. On this conception, the reasoning of 
the ECtHR focuses on examining if the challenged state measure manages to achieve a fair 
balance between individual rights and democratic values. Here the reasoning of the Court 
need not be obstructed by general concerns about its institutional legitimacy, nor does the 
will of the states acquire independent value. Its value will be a function of the states’ 
success in achieving this axiological equilibrium inherent in a democratic society. The 
purpose of the RVM is not simply the justification of “deference” to the state, but rather is 
the balanced recognition of the democratic values at the heart of the Convention. 
The adoption of the VVM by the Strasbourg court, somewhat typical in matters of 
religious freedom, is clearly questionable because it has led it to renounce its jurisdictional 
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role rather than to consolidate its institutional legitimacy vis-à-vis states.34 A jurisprudence 
so stuck to states’ circumstances and particularities is worrying because it prevents the 
ECtHR from articulating a stable framework of constitutional minimums that defines the 
threshold within which states may operate in managing their internal religious pluralism. 
The Lautsi case and the headscarf jurisprudence reflect this abandonment of the Court’s 
functions. The abrupt turnaround of the Grand Chamber with respect to Lautsi 2009, its ad 
hoc distancing from the reasoning used in Dahlab, and the replacement of the object of 
discussion demonstrate this absence of a constitutional model of minimums that enables 
the Court to assess what margin may be accorded to the Italian state without falling into 
mere political concession. Something similar is happening with the headscarf 
jurisprudence and with the Court’s reluctance to engage in a concrete analysis of 
proportionality between the prohibitive measures and the reasons supplied by states. The 
VVM used in these cases, given its lack of axiological basis, runs the risk of ending with 
“almost anything goes” for states. 
These defects of a VVM have led some commentators and some of the Court’s judges 
to insist that the Court must begin to let go of its resort to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, which in their opinion only made sense at the beginning of its course as a way of 
assuring institutional stability, and in a context of greater homogeneity of values among a 
smaller number of states.35 
This reflection seems clearly correct when it refers to the VVM. But I would say that 
the RVM, in contrast, still has a place in the assessment of the restrictions that a Convention 
right like that of religious freedom exercises over state autonomy. I have already indicated 
that Article 9.2 reflects the axiological duality of the Convention, which supports the 
assertion that the application of the right to religious freedom is subject to considerations 
of proportionality in the pursuit of diverse social goals, such that “interfering” with this 
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Martínez-Torrón (2003, 17). Judge De Mayer, in his partially dissenting opinion in the case of Z. v. Finland (February 
25, 1997), also expresses this view. Here he asserts the following: “I believe that it is high time for the Court to banish 
that concept from its reasoning. It has already delayed too long in abandoning this hackneyed phrase and recanting the 
relativism it implies. (…) But where human rights are concerned, there is no room for a margin of appreciation which 
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right does not automatically mean “violating” it. To what extent does this consideration 
bring into play a rationalized margin of appreciation doctrine? 
For authors such as George Letsas, for example, a RVM would in reality be 
superfluous. It would only tell us that a ruling of the ECtHR must be based on a 
proportionality test, something that the accommodation clauses of the Convention – 
provisions that would be the natural area to apply this doctrine –already contemplate.36 In 
contrast to Letsas’ view, I believe that a RVM is not redundant with respect to the 
accommodation clauses because it can be generalized as a way of orienting teleologically 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Letsas reaches his conclusion by considering that the best 
way of understanding rights in the Convention is to conceive of them as trumps – an 
understanding that he himself recognizes has little basis in the provisions of the 
Convention.37 For its part, the RVM can show that an abstract judgment of compatibility 
like that which the Chamber carried out in Lautsi 2009 turns out to be inadequate even 
when a restriction on the forum internum of freedom of religion was at stake, or can justify 
the rejection of strict proportionality scrutiny in the interpretation of 9.2. As I will explain 
next, taking religious liberty as my base, this version of the doctrine pays attention to the 
balance reached by the state taking into account its internal political, social, and cultural 
circumstances; takes into account how the state manages in general its internal religious 
pluralism; and appreciates the importance of the external pluralism currently existing in 
Europe. Finally, and although I do not fully develop this point, the RVM would be 
especially applicable to conflicts between rights and collective interests, as the issue of 
whether it is applicable to conflicts between Convention rights would remain open.38 
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38 On the reasons why a margin of appreciation does not clearly apply to conflicts between Convention rights in the 
application of the “rights and freedoms of others” part of the accommodation clauses, see for example Greer (2003, 431 




II. The dynamic of a rationalized version of the margin of appreciation 
The RVM could work as a general hermeneutic resource for the ECtHR on matters 
of religious freedom under certain prior premises that frame the function of the Court. For 
one thing, we must assume that the purpose of the ECHR, as tool for strengthening 
democracy in the region, is to consolidate a “minimum” standard of formal and substantive 
quality in protecting the Convention rights. However, as Michael Hutchinson observes, 
that does not mean that the role of the ECtHR is to settle, according to its own criteria and 
by means of its particular decisions, what this minimum threshold of universal protection 
is. In that case it would not be necessary to reach any type of balance with other 
considerations, and the deliberation carried out by the state would not really take on any 
transcendence; the ECtHR would take on the responsibility of deciding what this minimum 
is, and the rest would remain in the hands of national authorities. The problem remains that 
this minimum is not determined in the abstract. As a consequence, it would have a certain 
degree of mobility and its outlines would continue to depend on a balance between 
democracy and rights.39 
On the other hand, I asserted at the beginning of this work that we must keep in mind 
that the dual logic of the Convention makes it difficult to support a legal characterization 
of the right to religious freedom as a trump or as a “side constraint.” Again, this vision 
turns out to be too restrictive for thinking about judicially protected legal rights that can 
come into direct competition with public interest considerations. It has been observed that 
it is somewhat paradoxical that an international structure specifically designed to protect 
basic rights, which one would hope would establish the limits on the collective interests of 
states, should provide such means for their restriction via these same considerations of 
collective interest.40 Obviously, it is not easy to escape this general paradox of 
constitutionalism at the international level. But to account for the operating logic of the 
Convention we must assume some weaker conception of Convention rights that can have 
critical value without ending up blurring the outlines of this international instrument. 
From these two premises, the RVM assigns to the ECtHR the function of supervising 
the internal axiological balance of states faced with demands by their citizens for rights 
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protection. But its function is also systemic. The ECtHR has the task of consolidating a 
legal structure of rights protection in Europe that can serve as a general guide to action for 
states. Which elements or variables must be present in the implementation of this version 
of the margin of appreciation in the Court’s reasoning to carry out these functions? 
One basic element in the evaluation of a state’s rights-restrictive measure is to use 
the proportionality principle. I have already noted that in religious matters it is very 
common for the ECtHR to minimize its examination of proportionality and to resort to the 
VVM. This permits it to defer to the discretion of states in determining when a restriction 
on religious liberty is necessary within a democratic society.41 Many object that the ECtHR 
should apply a stricter proportionality test that serves as a limit on the discretion of the 
state. But the issue is how this proportionality scrutiny should be made, from the 
perspective of a RVM that takes seriously the axiological duality of the Convention. 
Once we confirm that a rights-restrictive measure is in pursuit of a legitimate end, 
the proportionality analysis can be conceived of as an examination of three issues: 1) 
Whether the measure is “suitable” for achieving that end; 2) Whether it is “necessary” for 
achieving that end (whether there are other, less restrictive ways of achieving that end with 
similar efficacy); and 3) Whether it is proportional in the strict sense, that is, whether it is 
balanced with respect to the degree of impact on the right and the degree to which the 
collective interest being pursued is satisfied. This test, usually called the German 
proportionality test, is used by many constitutional courts, and also with more or less depth 
by the European Court of Justice.42 But the ECtHR has not engaged in such a structured 
examination for understanding what the Convention requires with respect to the 
proportionality principle. When it has mentioned this principle at the time of determining 
whether the rights-restrictive state measure was “necessary in a democratic society,” its 
reasoning has turned on issues such as whether there is a pressing social need; whether the 
restriction on the right was the minimum possible given the alternatives available to the 
state; and whether a fair balance has been reached between the legitimate purpose and the 
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right.43 Yet the Strasbourg Court has not addressed all these questions simultaneously or 
in a sequential way. 
Without questioning the Court’s somewhat vague vision of the proportionality 
principle, the first aim of a RVM, in contrast to what a VVM would indicate, is that the 
ECtHR should embark effectively on an assessment of the proportionality of the challenged 
measure. This constitutes an important step in the effective protection of Convention rights 
against state decisions. Given that it is still a margin of appreciation doctrine, however, the 
version that I present assumes that in the proportionality assessment it is necessary to 
balance both first-order reasons and second-order reasons for action.44 Thus, when the time 
comes to resolve an eventual conflict between Convention rights and collective interests it 
is possible to use, together with first-order reasons, some second-order reasons that may 
grant a certain prominence to states and democratic considerations. These second-order 
reasons, which might be inconsequential if we completely rejected any margin of 
appreciation doctrine in the ECHR framework, would be relevant for analyzing the 
permissible level of restriction as well as the alternatives available to the state.  
A first question to be considered in the proportionality test is the general level of 
protection to the right in issue provided by the state. This consideration takes on 
transcendence when we assume the Court’s subsidiary role in a division of labor between 
member states and European supervision. If in global terms the state facilitates secure and 
fair access to this right, in some cases where the restriction of the right is not severe, a 
“theory of neutralization” like that used by the Grand Chamber in Lautsi might come into 
play. On the other hand, when this general level of protection is low, the ECtHR has reasons 
to be more rigorous with the state in its concrete judgment of proportionality. This later 
situation will require it to exercise its role as effective guarantor of Convention rights, and 
will mean that within its sphere of jurisdictional competence it will make up for a lack of 
action by a state in fulfilling its international commitments. In short, the more that national 
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authorities demonstrate a higher level of general protection of the right in question, the 
more their judgment can be relied upon. 
In the second place, the ECtHR may resort to what is called the “comparative 
method,” paying attention to how other European states behave to assess whether the 
minimum coercion possible has been used and if other less burdensome alternatives were 
possible.45 Given that the Convention arose to improve the level of human rights protection 
in Europe as a whole, one reason to call into question whether a state lacked other less 
restrictive alternatives is to see whether other states, in similar situations, have achieved 
the same social goal with different measures that have not involved this restriction of the 
right. 
In the third place, the state of the European consensus on a given matter can also be 
relevant in relaxing the stringency of the proportionality test, although for different reasons 
from those that the VVM offers. This relevance will depend on the presence of a link 
between consensus building and the rationale of gradual progress in the general system of 
human rights protection in Europe. Thus it would go together with the logic of an evolutive 
interpretation of the Convention, another essential interpretive resource in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.46 Addressing the lack of consensus to increase the freedom of 
the state would be instead questionable if it ends up resulting in a gradual reduction in the 
standard of protection in the region. The extent of European consensus becomes important 
as far it is useful to identify a gradual improvement in the quality of the European 
democratic systems while diminishing the “surprise” effect that an evolutive interpretation 
disassociated from the current “state of the issue” in Europe could imply. In this way, the 
relevance of the existing consensus depends on a balance between reasons of legal certainty 
and substantive concerns, seeking a mutual adjustment that favors the consolidation of 
human rights. If this mutual adjustment fails – something to be determined by the ECtHR 
– the lack of consensus would lack interpretive relevance because it would reflect only the 
use of the VVM. At the same time, concerns about institutional legitimacy as well as 
democratic considerations are also not enough to justify imposing a European consensus 
on a dissident state, because as I indicated earlier, imposing an external consensus on a 
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dissident state has a counter-majoritarian effect with respect to the democratic will 
expressed by that state.47 
In the fourth place, the issue of whether the state is really better placed to decide can 
also be key to guiding the determination of proportionality. If, after thorough consideration, 
the ECtHR perceives that a conflictive situation cannot be adequately resolved without 
deep knowledge of the circumstances of a particular society, then the Court has a strong 
reason for carrying out less strict scrutiny of the axiological balance reached by a state.48 
Even here, however – and focusing on religious freedom – this reason carries force only 
when the state’s impartiality towards religion has not been compromised. In those cases in 
which the state tends to privilege the majority religion or gives in to the most established 
denomination, it does not seem reasonable to assert that the state is still better situated than 
an external body to resolve the internal tensions that this lack of impartiality can entail.49 
The same can be said when the measure restricting religious freedom comes from a 
denominational or semi-denominational state. When the state itself pushes for an 
imbalance among the different religions practiced by its citizens and this imbalance has 
been approved of by its internal courts, it does not seem plausible to assert that the national 
authorities are better placed than an international body to monitor the management of its 
internal religious pluralism. The same reasoning can be applied to the state that has opted 
ideologically for a militant or active secularism. A state pushing strict secularism in all 
public spaces also cannot be perceived as an impartial guarantor of the right to religious 
freedom. 
Members of the Council of Europe have certainly full autonomy to decide on their 
state-religion system. The resulting pluralism of this national option should be able to be 
incorporated in the framework of the Convention, something that the Court has clearly 
accepted. States’ choice, however, must be compatible with their international 
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commitments regarding the right of religious freedom of their citizens. That is why in all 
these cases, the ECtHR must be stricter in its proportionality test because it takes on the 
function of watching over the Convention requirements of state neutrality with respect to 
religion. This conclusion is supported by the vision of the ECtHR itself on the role of the 
state in managing its internal religious pluralism. On one hand, the ECtHR has emphasized 
the link between religious freedom and democracy, stressing the role of this right in 
assuring the pluralism inherent in a democratic society.50 On the other hand, the ECtHR 
has insisted that the responsibility of the state is to assure, neutrally and impartially, the 
exercise of different religions and beliefs, as well as contributing to maintaining public 
order, religious harmony, and tolerance, especially when there are opposing groups.51 In 
this sense, the idea that the state is best situated only has force if its institutional position 
and prior practices enable it to exercise this responsibility reliably. 
Finally, for the RVM to constitute a good hermeneutic resource for balancing 
democracy and rights, the ECtHR must be coherent in its use of the doctrine and must 
provide generalizable standards that can serve as guides to states and their citizens. 
Certainly the proportionality test takes into consideration the social, legal, and political 
context of the challenged measure. For that reason, the Court cannot limit itself to carrying 
out an abstract analysis of compatibility between an individual right and a national 
regulation. But it is also part of the Court’s function to build – via its particular rulings – a 
general framework for understanding each of the Convention rights. Following Greer’s 
terminology, we might distinguish between two forms of axiological balancing: a) An “ad 
hoc” balancing, where deliberation is fully focused on the particular case, and b) A 
“structured” balancing, where a particular deliberation on rights and public interests is 
influenced by the aim of establishing a general doctrine of rights protection in Europe.52 
This structured balancing is what many voices demand from the ECtHR, not only for 
simple reasons of discursive rationality, but for the very purpose of the ECHR – achieving 
a closer union between the members of the Council of Europe through a common 
conception of and respect for human rights. Those who are skeptical that an international 
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body should have the last word on issues of rights, including when its rulings do not have 
the same legal value as those of domestic courts, can see as a virtue the fact that the ECtHR 
limits itself to seeking particular, reasonable solutions case by case, rather than establishing 
general doctrine. But that approach ends up eroding the Court’s jurisdictional function as 
interpreter of the Convention, because it makes the Court more like a simple arbitration 
body. The ECtHR can only maintain its legitimacy as a consolidated judicial institution if 
the production of doctrine is as important as the production of particular results.53 In this 
way, its role is to keep one eye on the material issue of balancing individual rights and 
democratic values in each particular case, and the other eye on the structural issue of 
providing generalizable, stable answers Europe-wide. That is why the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR on religious matters has been so criticized for its axiological incoherence, its 
variability from one matter to another, and its lack of predictability.54 
Unlike the VVM, which encompasses an unrestricted particularism, the RVM that I 
have presented has the capacity to provide these more generalizable and stable standards 
of protection, which also address the axiological dualism of the ECHR. Its adoption by the 
Strasbourg court would encourage it to assess challenged state measures using comparable 
parameters and with an eye to building a constitutional framework of minimums in the 
protection of rights in Europe. This framework, in addition to helping build a theory about 
the value and specific purpose of each right, should be comprehensive enough to make 
space for a plurality of legitimate social purposes without failing to preserve a minimum 
substantive quality in the standards of protection. The remaining work of providing 
institutional coverage of Conventional rights, as well as the determination of the optimal 
standard of protection beyond this threshold, is a question for each state. 
III. The Lautsi and Şahin cases from the perspective of the rationalized 
version of the margin of appreciation. 
Now that the dynamic of the RVM has been explored my suggestion is to apply the 
doctrine, even though briefly for reasons of space, to demonstrate why the deferential logic 
that the ECtHR used in the Lausti and Şahin cases did not turn out to be legally reasonable.  
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In the Lautsi case, interference with the forum internum of religious freedom 
occurred for the sake of preserving a cultural tradition of religious origin. Although the 
possibility of this kind of interference lacks textual support in the Convention, it was not 
an especially intense restriction given that the indoctrinating effect of a crucifix is not 
obvious when compared with the imposition of a religious practice or activity. It seems 
sensible to assume that the active or passive character of a religious symbol depends to a 
great extent on the particular context of its use. But the question is whether in this matter 
there are sufficient reasons to support deference to the state’s choice to require the crucifix 
in public school classrooms. Using the above parameters, the argument about the lack of 
consensus would not provide much support for this deference. Although there is no 
regulatory consensus in Europe regarding religious symbols, the requirement of the 
crucifix is rather exceptional given that it only appears in a minority of European countries. 
This fact undercuts the strength of considerations of legal certainty that might favor the 
position of the Italian state. In addition, the lack of regulatory homogeneity with respect to 
the crucifix is more due to a plurality of state-church systems and traditions than to a 
genuine pluralism in understanding religious freedom and its limits. For this reason, the 
absence of homogeneity should play a minor role within the logic of a gradual 
consolidation of the right to religious freedom in the region. 
There is also reason to doubt that a state whose cultural traditions privilege the 
symbols of a particular religious denomination to the detriment of non-believers or other 
religious minorities is really better situated to resolve impartially the conflicts that the 
institutional use of this symbol has generated. For this reason, neither the argument from 
lack of consensus nor the idea that the state is better placed would in this case justify 
granting broad deference, keeping in mind as well that the Italian regulation has a weak 
democratic pedigree, coming as it does out of decrees from the 1920s, mainly from the 
fascist period, without further parliamentary confirmation, and that it has also not been 
assessed by the Italian constitutional court.55 
From here one might wonder whether the Italian state used the least restrictive 
measure possible when interfering with individual religious freedom to preserve its cultural 
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traditions. As the ECtHR has aptly recognized, maintaining cultural traditions falls within 
the legitimate purposes of a democratic state.56 But the issue is whether the Italian state 
had other less burdensome alternatives that did not require it to abandon this objective, and 
whether it used the minimum level of coercion possible. Using the comparative method, it 
seems false to say there were no alternatives for maintaining the cultural tradition of the 
crucifix in Italy. In fact, I have already noted that in Spain, Greece, Ireland, San Marino, 
and Romania, which do not have an express regulation, this type of symbol remains present 
in some public schools. The imposition via regulation turns out then to be unnecessary (or 
at least the Italian state has not proved that necessity in its social circumstances). Nor is the 
imposition via regulation certainly the best way of maintaining the cultural traditions of a 
democratic society. The persistence of traditions is connected to many interlinked factors, 
and to a great degree depends on how engrained they are among the public and on the 
existence of a social setting of mutual tolerance and respect. Given that there are other less 
burdensome and coercive options, the disproportionality of a measure that affects a 
protected sphere cannot be compensated for with an openness to religious pluralism in 
other educational spheres, as a theory of neutralization has little strength in this case. What 
is really in play, then, is the will of the Italian state expressed in its complaint to Lautsi 
2009, which, as I have noted, does not have value in itself under a rationalized version of 
the margin of appreciation. 
This by no means implies that the only option compatible with the Convention is to 
prohibit exhibiting the crucifix in public schools. Although I cannot develop it further here, 
the RVM would also make it possible to show that the abstract analysis of compatibility 
carried out by the Chamber in Lautsi 2009 is deficient, due to its opacity to contextual 
factors, and because there are reasons to argue that other regulatory options or contextual 
solutions to the controversy of crucifixes in schools are compatible with the Convention.   
With respect to the issues raised by the Şahin case, I would say that we are looking 
at a more severe restriction, this time on the forum externum of religious freedom, a right 
that according to Article 9.2 can be balanced against other social considerations. The issue 
here is again whether we have reasons to defer to the judgment of the state. In contrast to 
what happened in Italy regarding the exhibition of the crucifix, the prohibitions on the use 
                                                     




of the Islamic headscarf in Turkey are supported by the constitutional principle of state 
secularism, and this regulatory option has the approval of the country’s constitutional court. 
But the reasons for deferring to the state in the case of the restriction on the headscarf in 
the university are even weaker than in the Lautsi case. As to the European consensus, 
practically no European state limits the use of the headscarf in universities, and it is 
reasonable to assert that looking to this contrary consensus favors the protection of 
religious freedom in the region. In addition, I dare say that the tendency to prohibit the 
wearing of religious clothes that is gaining ground in some European countries has been 
encouraged, at least in part, by the great deference that the ECtHR has shown with these 
restrictions on religious freedom that began in Turkey and France. 
The argument that the state is better placed to decide on the appropriateness of 
limiting the use of the headscarf in universities is not either well positioned to justify 
deference to the Turkish state. As I noted above, state secularism is a legitimate but not 
unbiased political choice with respect to religious pluralism in a democratic society. 
Looking at this political choice, just as looking at the institutional choice of the 
denominational state, the ECtHR takes on a qualified safeguarding role in making sure that 
this model of religion-state relations does not prevent the fulfillment of the state’s 
international commitments with respect to Convention rights. At the same time, the choice 
of active secularism typically comes with a low general standard of protection of this 
freedom in public spaces, and as a result there are few reasons simply to trust the judgment 
of the state. The way to carry out this supervision is to use a strict proportionality test, or 
at least to engage in a detailed assessment of proportionality.  
In this proportionality test, the ECtHR should have verified in a detailed way whether 
the general reasons supplied by the Turkish state for prohibiting the headscarf in 
universities are convincing. For one thing, the existence of a constitutional principle of 
secularism is not determinative or sufficient, given that we can see via the comparative 
method that even in France, which also embraces this model, secularism is maintained 
without this restriction on religious freedom in universities. In this sense, this constitutional 
principle does not release the state from its obligation to demonstrate the presence of a 




justified that it lacks other less coercive alternatives for achieving its legitimate purposes 
with the same efficacy. 
Something similar occurs when we look at the other general arguments that Turkey 
supplied, arguments based in hypothetical connections amongst the use of the headscarf 
and the risks to democracy in Turkey, the promotion of Islamic radicalism, and the 
encouragement of gender discrimination. The Strasbourg Court should have analyzed in 
detail the strength of such connections and whether they support the use of institutional 
coercion in the university context. In the same way, the Court should have supervised if 
these arguments were convincing enough in the particular case of Leyla Şahin. As Judge 
Tulkens aptly observed in her dissenting vote, the state did not demonstrate at any time that 
the use of the headscarf by an adult such as Şahin was forced on her or subordinated her as 
a woman. Nor was there any indication that Şahin wore this article of clothing for any 
extremist political purpose, or that the use of the headscarf by this student would have led 
to problems of public order or would have affected other students or limited any of their 
rights. In summary, and leaving aside other interesting questions, the ECtHR’s resistance 
to engaging with these arguments in this concrete case indicates an abandonment of 
jurisdictional functions in protecting the appellant’s human right to religious freedom, and 
can only be explained by the VVM. 
My objective in this paper has been to show that the ECtHR would have exercised 
more satisfactorily its jurisdictional role within the dual logic of the Convention by 
adopting a RVM in its jurisprudence on religious symbols in the educational setting. That 
also would have enabled it to build a more stable and coherent framework of constitutional 
minimums around the requirements of this Convention right. Returning to my first words, 
it is true that the interpretation of international human rights conventions is an especially 
delicate activity, and that the ECtHR is an institution that has the difficult responsibility of 
protecting rights, moving between the turbulent waters of values and political pressures of 
the highest level.57 This is an arduous judicial task that for a domestic judge could involve 
a significant erosion of his or her jurisdictional independence. But constant political 
concession to states in highly sensitive religious conflicts will not make it possible, in the 
                                                     
57 The unprecedented political and institutional uproar within the European system of human rights protection that the 
Chamber’s ruling in the Lautsi case provoked is a good demonstration of this. On the political and legal responses that 




long run, for the Strasbourg court to maintain its institutional auctoritas in Europe, because 
when someone almost always agrees with you, even when he or she should not, you end 
up thinking that your reasons are the only ones that matter.  
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